Firing the Unproductive Employee: Will Civil Service Reform Make a Difference? by Ban, Carolyn et al.
87
FIRING THE UNPRODUCTIVE EMPLOYEE:
WILL CIVIL SERVICE REFORM MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
Carolyn Ban
U. S. Office of Personnel Management
Edie N. Goldenberg




Civil service reform included a set of changes intended to facilitate the firing of consistently un-
productive employees. This article describes the background and logic of these changes, reviews
the status of their implementation, and offers preliminary evidence on their consequences for per-
sonnel management in the federal government.
Introduction
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) and associated reorganiza-
tions constitute the most significant effort to restructure the federal personnel
management system since the Pendleton Act a century earlier. The purpose of
the reform is to increase the authority of managers in a number of personnel
areas, while at the same time protecting employees against arbitrary personnel
actions.
This paper focuses on one key set of reform mechanisms, those changes in-
tended to facilitate the release of consistently unproductive employees. The
background and logic of the reforms are described and an update provided con-
cerning the status of implementation and results thus far. Although four years
have elapsed since the passage of the Act, we have limited experience with many
central reform provisions which have only recently been fully implemented.
Nevertheless, the general dimensions of reform consequences are becoming clear.
* The authors wish to thank the following people for their assistance: Wilma Lehman, Tom Johnson,
and Charles Gossett. The views expressed are those of the authors and not the official position
of the Office of Personnel Management. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the
Annual meeting of the Mid-West Political Science Association, Chicago, 1980.
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Reform Background, and Changes
The Nature of the ~~°&reg;bl~ a
The of the President’s Personnel Project
The authors of the President’s Personnel Management Project which
provided the basis for much of the Civil Service Reform Act, identified a number
of problems with the federal personnel system. One area they saw as having
problems was the firing of unproductive employees. On the one hand, they
recognized a number of factors which deterred managers from taking actions
against poor performers. On the other hand, they were concerned about the
possibility of arbitrary or political abuse in such actions. Correcting these prob-
lems simultaneously is difficult because of the inherent tension among them. 1
For example, expanding managers’ authority provides more opportunity for
abuses. Conversely, guaranteeing due process can lead to excessive delays and
rigidity. Nevertheless, civil service reform includes a variety of provisions de-
signed to address these problems.
1. Factors deterring managers from taking actions against poor performers
While supervisors always had the authority to remove or demote poor per-
formers, they avoided doing so for a number of reasons identified by the Per-
sonnel Management Project (PMP) report (1977: 40). The first problem area
was procedural. The PMP saw a lack of adequate procedures for identifying
poor performance, and for taking appropriate action once poor performance
had been identified. The second problem area was the complexity and protracted
nature of appeals procedures, which inhibited managers from taking actions.
The third problem was the attitudes and behaviors of supervisors and managers
themselves. Some supervisors failed to counsel employees at an early stage or
to explain how they could improve their performance. Other supervisors great-
ly over-extended their efforts to counsel or reassign employees, but were un-
willing to fire employees whose performance did not improve.
2. or political abuse
The authors of the PMP (1977: 52) recognized that providing greater flex-
ibility to managers in this, as in other areas, brought with it the potential for
abuse. At the same time, they noted that &dquo;the complexity and red tape which
now surround personnel management processes may serve as a refuge for the
incompetent and yet do little to prevent abuses motivated by politics, cronyism,
or special interests. What is needed is a reorganization which will reduce the
red tape on one hand and which will provide strong and effective merit protec-
tion on the other.&dquo; The PMP also expressed concern about past abuses, some
of which were politically motivated, and stated that &dquo;The Civil Service Com-
mission has not been able to provided adequate protection against these abuses.&dquo;
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The Nature of the Reforms s
The reforms contained in the Act designed to address these problems focus-
ed upon four concerns.
1. I’rocedures for apprczising performance crnd for taking actions based on poor
performance
Civil service reform requires every agency to develop new procedures for ap-
praising their employees’ performance. These sytems are based on the employees’
actual activities, rather than on traits or personal characteristics. While each
agency may develop an appraisal system to meet its needs, each system breaks
an individual’s appraisal down into specific job elements and standards against
which performance is rated. These elements and standards are developed by
the supervisor, ideally with the employee’s participation.
Prior to reform, one set of procedures for downgrading or removing a federal
employee applied, regardless of the reasons for the action. This set of procedures
was termed &dquo;adverse actions.&dquo;2 The reform created new procedures, &dquo;actions
based on unacceptable performance,&dquo; linked to the new performance appraisal
systems. The intent was to make it easier to dismiss employees for poor per-
formance than it had been previously. Each performance appraisal system re-
quires supervisors to designate some performance elements and standards as
&dquo;critical.&dquo; Under the new procedures, employees can be dismissed or demoted
if their performance on one or more critical elements is unacceptable. This is
a significant change, since managers no longer must consider employees’ per-
formance as a whole; rather, individuals can be fired or demoted if they fail
to perform acceptably on any single critical element. Civil service reform also
requires a lesser standard of proof for actions based on unacceptable
performance. 1
2. Improving the appeals process
Reform in the area of appeals focused both on streamlining the process, and
on enhancing the legitimacy of the employee appeals process. The authors of
the PMP report (1977: 40) saw the &dquo;incredible length&dquo; of the appeal process
and its extreme complexity as &dquo;one of the greatest deterrents in Government
to discharging employees whose performance is unsatisfactory.&dquo; The Reform
Act attempted to address this problem in several ways, first by reducing the
number of levels of appeal available, 4 and second, by requiring the Merit Systems
Protection Board, which was established to hear appeals, to set a time limit
within which appeals must be processed.
The Act also made a number of changes to enhance the legitimacy of the
appeals process. First, it separated the function of hearing appeals from the
function of issuing personnel rules and regulations. Prior to reform, adverse
action appeals were heard by the Federal Employee Appeals Authority, a part
of the Civil Service Commission. Civil service reform created an independent
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body (MSPB) to hear appeals. With this separation of functions, OPM is ex-
pected to speak clearly as the representative of management, while MSPB serves
as an impartial arbiter, taking a neutral rather than pro-management stance.
From the manager’s point of view, not only was the appeals process long
and complex, but actions were frequently overturned because of trivial pro-
cedural errors by management. One example, taken from a General Account-
ing Office report, conveys the dimensions of the problem:
An agency fired an employee for beating his supervisor with a
baseball bat. FEAA (The Federal Employee Appeals Authority) over-
turned his agency had not given theremoval, contending the 
employee adequate notice of firing. The agency had to reinstate the
employee in the same position, under the same supervisor, and reim-
burse the employee eight month’s back pay (GAO, 1978).
The Reform Act changed the law in order to reduce reversals on appeal for
minor procedural errors. Now, a procedural error invalidates an action only
if it actually is &dquo;harmful.&dquo; This applies both to adverse actions and actions
based on unacceptable performance. MSPB defines harmful error as &dquo;error
by the agency in the application of its procedures which, in the absence of cure
of the error, might have caused the agency to reach a conclusion different than
the one reached 5 Unless the procedural error is harmful, MSPB cannot use
it as a basis for reversal.
3. Changing the attitudes of supervisors and employees
If new procedures are going to have any effect, then the attitudes of super-
visors and employees will also have to change. Supervisors must be willing both
to counsel employees with problems and to fire or demote those who do not
improve. Employees must also have confidence in the system, i.e., they must
expect that poor performers will not be tolerated, and that the system will be
equitable.
Changes in attitudes are harder to legislate than new procedures. The legisla-
tion, and OPM’s implementing regulations, leave to agencies a great deal of
discretion in the development of their performance appraisal systems, and also
leave to agencies the responsibility for training supervisors in their use.
4. preventing political abuse
While the Act permitted supervisors to fire or demote employees whose work
was clearly poor, the intent of the Act was also to protect employees from ar-
bitrary or politically motivated punishment. The excesses of the Nixon ad-
ministration were fresh in peoples’ minds, but the sources of concern and legal
precedents regarding federal employee job protections predate Nixon. Over the
past several decades the courts have become increasingly involved in the ad-
ministrative details of personnel management.
Prior to the 1950s, the law on dismissing government employees was fairly
simple: as far as the Constitution was concerned, government employees worked
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at the pleasure of their superiors. This principle, usually referred to as the &dquo;doc-
trine of privilege,&dquo; was neatly summed up in an oft-quoted statement by Justice
Holmes: &dquo;the petitioner [a policeman] may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman&dquo; (McAuliffe v.
New Bedford, 1892: 216, 220). The doctrine was based on the premise that an
individual has no constitutional right to public employment and consequently
can be fired (or not hired) for a wide range of reasons.
More recently, &dquo;due process&dquo; provisions have been repeatedly invoked and
expanded in cases dealing with public employment. A doctrine of substantial
interest has replaced the doctrine of privilege. The courts have held that the
conditions imposed by the government upon civil servants which interfere with
their ordinary constitutional rights as citizens cannot be justified simply on the
basis that there is no constitutional right to public employment. Consequently,
removing an individual from public employment may violate the constitutional
requirement of procedural due process (see Rosenbloom, 1977). The Act in-
cludes provisions designed to protect employees from political abuse. A set of
merit system principles was written into law, as well as a number of detailed
formal statutory protections.
Title I of the Act establishes in law both the basic merit principles and the
specific personnel practices that are prohibited in the federal personnel system.
The President and agency heads are responsible for assuring that personnel
management in the Executive Branch is carried out in accordance with these
principles. Specifically, Title I states that not only agency heads, but also those
to whom agency heads delegate personnel management authority, are responsi-
ble for preventing prohibited personnel practices and for properly executing
all civil service laws and regulations.
Managers are expected to protect their career employees against improper
political influence and personal favoritism by recruiting, hiring, advancing and
retaining them on the basis of individual ability and performance without regard
to political affiliation, race, color, national origin, sex, marital status, age or
handicapping condition. Employees who do not perform adequately, and who
cannot or will not improve, are expected to be fired. These tenets are among
those commonly referred to as the &dquo;merit principles.&dquo;
While these principles are implicit in earlier laws, executive orders, rules and
regulations, no comprehensive statement of the merit principles that apply to
federal personnel management existed prior to civil service reform. Of course,
codification of merit system principles will not by itself prevent abuse, but their
presence in the Act underlines their importance and reminds managers to re-
main sensitive to merit principles as the other reform provisions are implemented.
The Act also provides formal statutory protections for all employees subject
to dismissals or downgradings. These include formal 30 days advance written
notice, reasonable time to answer orally and in writing, the right to representa-
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tion by an attorney or other representative, and a written decision with specific
reasons for the action. In addition, the individual has a right to appeal to the
MSPB or to grieve through union grievance procedures. These protections were
previously provided by statute only to veterans although they had been extended
to others by executive order in 1974.
The Status of Implementation and to Date
Although it may be too early to pass final judgment on these provisions of
the Act, it is not too early to make some preliminary assessments. This section
describes the process of implementation, including the problems encountered
and the results to date.
Implementing New Procedures for Performance Appraisal
and for Taking Actions on Unacceptable Performance
While implementation of some sections of the Act began in January, 1979
the authors of the Act recognized that developing new performance appraisal
systems and putting them into place would take some time. As a result the
deadline for implementation of this provision was October, 1981 and relatively
few agencies had systems in place before that date. OPM issued interim regula-
tions to allow agencies to begin using the new provision for taking actions
based on unacceptable performance. However, the newly created MSPB, which
was empowered to review all OPM regulations, ruled in the case of Wells v.
. 
Harris (1979) that OPM’s interim regulations were invalid and that agencies
could take performance-based actions under the new procedures only after they
had established their performance appraisal systems.
In gauging the impact of this ruling, it is necessary to keep in mind two points.
First, MSPB ruled that agencies could continue to take performance-based ac-
tions under the pre-reform procedures until their performance appraisal systems
were in place. While the evidentiary requirements under these procedures are
somewhat more stringent, agency personnel specialists were already familiar
with them and were able to continue to take actions in clear-cut cases. Second,
what was required by MSPB for an agency’s performance appraisal system to
be considered established was quite lenient. Essentially, if OPM approved the
system, it could be considered established. Shortly after the Wells decision, OPM
stepped up its approval process.
Given that MSPB decided in the Wells case that agencies could not use the
new procedures for taking performance-based actions until their new perfor-
mance appraisal systems were in place, few agencies have yet used them. Agen-
cies were required to have their new performance appraisal systems in place
by October 1, 1981, and virtually all agencies met their deadline, but, as of early
1982, few agencies have had systems in place long enough so that appraisals
have been conducted and actions based on those appraisals have been taken.
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Effects of the New Appeals Procedures
One goal of the Act was to expedite the appeals process. In this area results
are mixed. When the legislation was being designed, the Administration hoped
for a 60-day turnaround from MSPB. However, the legislation only required
MSPB to set a time limit and did not specify what it should be. In fact, MSPB
has set a limit of 120 days for field office cases and that limit is usually met. 8
It has imposed no such limit on cases appealed to the full Board, and delays
of several months are not unusual there.
Another goal of the Act was to reduce the number of cases overturned for
minor technical errors. At first glance, it would appear that this goal has been
met. Based on a sample of approximately 1,000 cases tracked by OPM, only
four percent of cases adjudicated were reversed for harmful procedural error.
This compares favorably with a 15 percent rate of reversal for procedural error
in both 1978 and 1977. On the other hand, MSPB has been reversing a much
larger number of cases on their merits than did the Federal Employee Appeals
Authority. Based on the sample of 1,000 cases, almost 20 percent were over-
turned based on their merits, compared to only 10 percent in 1977 and 1978.
There are two reasons for this change. First, under the previous appeals
system, cases were reversed on procedures before their merits were even con-
sidered. Now more cases survive to face the test of merit. Second, MSPB has
introduced new criteria for establishing merit. One area where important new
precedents have been set is the link between an employee’s off-duty miscon-
duct and his or her job and official responsibilities. MSPB has been requiring
a much more direct relation between the two in order to uphold an action based
on off-duty misconduct than had been the case in the past. In the major deci-
sion in this area, Merritt v. Justice (1981), the Board found that the off-duty
use of drugs by a law enforcement official, who had shared them with work
associates, was not egregious misconduct and that it was the agency’s burden
to prove the nexus or link. The Board did not believe that the agency had done
so, and reversed the initial decision.
Another area in which there has been a significant change from previous prac-
tice is in determining the appropriateness of penalties. Under the previous system,
agency actions were either upheld or overturned in toto. MSPB regards their
charge as including the right to review not just merits of the action but also
the appropriateness of the penalty levied by the agency and to change inap-
propriate penalties if the discipline imposed by the agency is arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable (Douglas v. ~~4, 1981).
Thus, while the number of actions reversed for procedural errors has de-
creased, as the authors of the Act had planned, the sharp increase in the number
of reversals for merit means that the total number of cases reversed has gone
down only one percent (from 25 percent to 24 percent). This is an unanticipated
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consequence of the creation of a new agency to hear appeals, and one which
may have far-reaching effects.
Supervisor Attitude
Perhaps the most important intended effect of these reforms is to make
employees believe that job performance matters. For changes in disciplinary
rules to be effective, supervisors must believe both that their agency’s perfor-
mance appraisal system is useful for evaluating employee performance and that
the procedures for taking an action based on unacceptable performance are
workable, i.e., not too complex or time-consuming. Moreover, eventually
employee attitudes must change as well; they must believe that action will be
taken against consistently poor performers.
OPM administers surveys periodically in order to see to what extent these
attitudes are changing. The baseline survey, conducted in May 1979 (LJ. S. Of-
fice of Personnel Management, 1980) showed, room for improvement. Many
employees failed to perceive a strong connection between poor performance
and the likelihood of negative sanctions. As Graph 1 shows, only approximately
one-third of the workforce felt that they would be demoted or removed from
their job if they performed poorly. Supervisory personnel perceived negative
consequences as slightly more likely. However, even at these levels, generally
less than 50 percent saw a relationship between poor performance and negative
consequences. About 30 percent of federal employees felt that their organiza-
tions moved marginal and unsatisfactory workers to positions where they could
be ignored and that disciplinary actions were avoided because of the paperwork
required.
Attitudes toward the performance appraisal system in place before reform
were quite negative. Approximately one-half (49 percent) of surveyed employees
felt that their performance rating presented a fair and accurate picture of their
actual job performance. Over one-half (55 percent) agreed that there was a
tendency for supervisors to give the same performance rating regardless of how
well people perform their jobs. Further, as Graph 2 shows, many employees,
particularly those in non-supervisory positions, questioned the fairness of
disciplinary actions taken.
OPM’s second survey, conducted in late 1980 (U. S. Office of Personnel
Management, forthcoming), covered only senior-level federal employees (GS
13-15 and SES members). Since it is supervisors who must initiate actions, their
willingness to do so and their perceptions of the fairness of the process are
critical. In reviewing the results, we find no significant changes in attitudes
among supervisors so far. For example, less than 50 percent of supervisors in
both 1979 and 1980 agreed that &dquo;When an employee continues to do his/her
job poorly supervisors here will take the appropriate corrective action&dquo; (44 per-




in 1979 felt that &dquo;Downgrading or removing poor performers in this organiza-
tion is avoided because of the paperwork that is required&dquo; (43 percent agreed
in 1979; 51 percent in 1980).
Furthermore, there appears to be both a general lack of information about
the reforms among supervisors, and a skepticism about their effects. When asked
to compare CSRA procedures for taking action against poor performers to pre-
CSRA procedures, over three-quarters of supervisors said either that they did
not know what changes had taken place or that they had not noticed any change.
Forty-five percent of supervisors said they did not know if the CSRA procedures
were more rapid, and 36 percent said that the new procedures took the same
amount of time to process as the pre-CSRA procedures. Forty-one percent of
supervisors said that they did not know if the current procedures were more
or less complex than pre-CSRA procedures, and 37 percent reported that the
old and new procedures were equally complicated.
Political Abuse
As these new procedures have gone into effect, has there been an increase
in arbitrary actions or in dismissals for political reasons? A superficial reading
of the statistics showing an increase in cases reversed on their merits might lead
one to conclude that there has been. In fact, in very few of these cases did the
defendant claim that the firing was for arbitrary or political reasons. Even dur-
ing a highly-charged transition period, there have been few public charges of
political abuses in firings or reassignments. And a recent study of career federal
executives during the transition found no involuntary reassignments prior to
the 120-day time limit set by law. 9
Conclusions
One problem in evaluating the effects of these provisions is that they were
initially oversold. In advocating the Act, Carter emphasized the fact that few
federal employees were terminated for poor performance, thus stressing the
negative aspects of the Act. The implication conveyed was that there were
thousands of incompetents on government payrolls and that, as soon as their
hands were untied, federal managers would rush to dismiss them. In fact, of
course, the situation in most agencies is more complex. Managers are much less
likely to be faced with employees who are rank incompetents than with marginal
employees who do not perform up to their full potential, and who require
counseling or reassignment.
In addition to reinforcing the negative image of the bureaucracy, the oversell-
ing of the Act set up the number of people fired as the de facto criterion for
the success of these provisions. The issue should not be simply whether more
people are fired but whether supervisors and managers deal appropriately with
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problem employees. But looking at the number of people fired is much simpler
than examining the dynamics of the supervisor-subordinate relationship.
Furthermore, President Carter used a statistic of questionable validity, giv-
ing the impression that only 226 people had been fired in 1977, when in fact
the total number was in the thousands. Nonetheless, if we look only at the sim-
ple criterion of the number of people fired, the early results are not encourag-
ing. A comparison of the number of actions taken in 1978 and 1980 shows a
considerable decrease, from 7,709 in 1978 to 6,781 in 1980.10
~ut, as should be clear, there are a number of possible explanations for this
decline. The Wells decision and confusion about the new procedures may have
had a temporary chilling effect on agencies’ willingness to take actions. A more
likely reason lies in the fact that a hiring freeze was in place for most of 1980.
During a freeze, supervisors have no incentive to fire any but the most egregious-
ly poor performers, since they will not be able to hire replacements for people
they discharge.
But it is also possible that these provisions of the Act will end up having very
little effect. The reforms were largely mechanistic, focusing on new formal pro-
cedures for taking actions and for appeals. The authors of the Personnel
Management Project recognized that a large proportion of the problem rested
with supervisors and managers themselves. Simply creating new procedures
without communicating these changes aggressively or training supervisors in
their use cannot be expected to cause major change. In fact, many supervisors
receive little if any training in such matters as conducting performance appraisals
and dealing with problem employees. And, in the current era of severe budget
cuts, training is one of the first things to be dropped. Evidence to date is that
most managers do not know about the reforms in this area, and that those who
do are skeptical about their effects. Without increased efforts to communicate
these changes, and to train supervisors in how to use the new procedures, we
cannot be overly optimistic about their long-range effects (on these points, see
Bellone above and Flanders and Klauss below - Ed.).
NOTES
1 Alan K. Campbell, former Director of the U. S. Office of Personnel Management, has even
suggested that the changes produced by CSRA are in some ways "almost contradictory" in nature.
See Campbell (1977).
2 Technically speaking, an "action" is any change in personnel status. In this discussion, we
are concerned with three types of actions: dismissals, demotions, and suspensions. An adverse ac-
tion procedure can be taken against any employee "for such cause as will promote the efficiency
of the service." The majority of these actions are for misconduct, which can range all the way
from taking leave without permission to assault and battery or murder. CSRA also created a new
category of short suspensions. Only suspensions for more than 14 days are now considered full
adverse actions. Short suspensions, those less than 14 days, are not appealable.
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3 Prior to reform, all adverse actions had to be based on a "preponderance of the evidence."
Now that standard is reduced to "substantial evidence" for performance-based cases. This change
was expected to make it easier for supervisors and managers to develop the documentation necessary
to take such actions and to support their actions on appeals. MSPB recently stated the distinction
between the two as follows: "Unlike the preponderance standard, which requires evidence that
a reasonable person would accept as sufficient to find a contested fact more probably true than
untrue, the substantial evidence standard requires evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable
and fair-minded persons in exercising impartial judgment might reach different conclusions. See
Parker v. Defense Logistics Agency (1980).
4 Appeals may now proceed through the following steps: 1) initial appeal to Merit Systems Pro-
tection Board (MSPB) field offices; 2) request to the full Board to reopen the case; and 3) appeal
to the U. S. Court of Appeals or Court of Claims. Decisions of negotiated grievances may also
be appealed in court.
5 MSPB regulation appearing at 5 CFR. 1201.56 (c) (3). MSPB recently clarified the definition
of "harmful error." "... the question is whether it was within the range of appreciable probabili-
ty that the error had a harmful effect upon the outcome before the agency ... the decisive factors
are the closeness of the agency’s decision, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and any
steps taken to mitigate the effect of the error." Parker v. Defense Logistics Agency (1980).
6 An employee may use negotiated grievance procedures only if two conditions are met. First,
he/she must be a member of a bargaining unit. This is not the same as being a union member.
It means that a union has won the right to represent employees at that location, and must represent
all bargaining unit employees, whether or not they are paid union members. Second, the type of
action taken must be covered by the negotiated contract. Civil service reform permits but does not
require, a broad scope of coverage for negotiated grievance procedures.
7 The Veterans Preference Act of 1944 actually extended these rights not only to veterans but
to others eligible for veterans preference, i.e., spouses and dependents of deceased or disabled
veterans.
8 In FY 1980, MSPB Field Offices processed 93 percent of the cases brought under Civil Service
Reform within the 120-day limit. There was a sizable backlog of cases which originated before civil
service reform. MSPB did less well with these cases, meeting the four-month deadline only 61 per-
cent of the time. See MSPB (1981).
9 See U. S. Office of Personnel Management, SES Special Study of Managerial Flexibility dur-
ing a Change in Administration (forthcoming). It should be pointed out that subtle political pressure
will not show up in any type of record keeping system since involuntary reassignments are evi-
denced only if someone complains about the reassignment.
10 The number of resignations in lieu of adverse action increased slightly, from 1,030 in 1978
to 1,242 in 1980. Figures taken from U. S. Office of Personnel Management’s Central Personnel
Data File. Comparable figures for 1981 will not be available until mid-1982.
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